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10.1  Introduction 
The international or “tradable”  nature of  banking services (and of 
financial services more generally) has been well established. It is dif- 
ficult to identify any class of services for which an international demand 
or a capacity for international supply has been more clearly demon- 
strated. Foreign banking institutions are prominent in most financial 
centers of the developed world.  “International banking”  has become 
almost a clichk.  But despite  the apparent ease with  which  banking 
operations have crossed national boundaries in recent years, there re- 
main important obstacles to efforts by  banks to serve customers in 
foreign markets. Increasingly, these obstacles are becoming a focus for 
international debate and dispute. 
Obstacles to international trade in banking services arise for the most 
part because of  the special nature of banking services and the irnpor- 
tance that all nations place on the regulation of banking operations. In 
every country, banking operations are subject to special regulations 
and restrictions. These regulations and restrictions are almost always 
intended to ensure the stability of national banking systems, to provide 
national authorities with effective instruments for economic manage- 
ment, or generally to encourage thrift and other social virtues. That 
these policies sometimes hinder the establishment of foreign banking 
operations or restrict the scope of such operations once they have been 
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established is usually an unintended  (although not always deeply re- 
gretted by domestic banking institutions) side effect. 
Having grown up in response to particular national circumstances, 
policies toward  banking  operations  vary widely from  one nation  to 
another. There is no international consensus about what are and are 
not legitimate activities for banks, about the mechanisms required for 
adequate supervision of banks, or about the roles that banks are sup- 
posed to play in the larger economy. Under the circumstances, it is 
not surprising that there is no consensus about the rules under which 
banks from different countries should be allowed to compete with each 
other within national markets. 
International trade in services seems to have been identified as the 
next frontier for trade liberalization-especially  by  U.S. policymak- 
ers-and  trade in banking services is likely to be an important topic 
for discussion whenever a new round of trade talks gets started. In 
this paper, I consider several aspects of trade in banking services and 
note the possibilities for and the problems facing expanded international 
trade in banking services. To the extent that this paper has a unifying 
theme, it is the question of  whether trade in banking services really 
should be made a priority item in a larger effort to expand opportunities 
for trade in  services. My tentative conclusion is that-at  least for the 
major industrialized countries-the  game is just not worth the candle. 
To  identify progress in  this area as an essential requirement for the 
upcoming round of trade negotiations is to risk the failure of the talks. 
But much more important, to succeed in facilitating expanded trade in 
banking services may be to accomplish  something we may one day 
regret. 
In part, this conclusion arises from consideration of the obstacles to 
be overcome. Painstaking negotiations will  be  required to reconcile 
legitimate national needs to regulate banking with the demands of freer 
and fairer international trade. In the process, many important interests 
will be threatened and a great deal of political capital will have to be 
expended-capital that might be more fruitfully employed in seeking 
improved trading opportunities in other areas. These problems are, I 
think, well understood and do not need elaboration here. 
My  reluctance to make a big issue out of trade in banking services 
stems also from some uncertainty  about whether more international 
trade in banking services is unambiguously a “good thing.”  Raising a 
question like this among economists may seem a bit odd. Our instinct 
is to urge freer trade in all areas. But as I began to think about trade 
in banking services, I found myself becoming less sure that my instincts 
were right in this case. 
None of us believes, after all, in completely  “free”  banking at the 
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degree of  bank regulation  or what regulatory mechanisms  are most 
effective, but we all recognize a need for some regulation.  If  we do 
not want “free”  banking at the national level, maybe we should not 
want “freer” banking at the international level. Pertinent in this regard 
is the current debate over whether and under what conditions to allow 
increased interstate banking in the United States. To be sure, many of 
the arguments against interstate banking reflect little more than a desire 
in some quarters for intranational protectionism. But behind all of this 
smoke, there do lie some serious questions about the consequences of 
more interstate banking.  It is difficult, for example, not to harbor at 
least the suspicion that the Continental Illinois debacle might have been 
considerably harder to deal with if the banks involved had been truly 
national. If there is a case for limiting interstate banking, maybe there 
is also a case for limiting international banking. 
Obviously,  there are no simple answers to these questions. In this 
paper, I try to lay out the potential benefits of increased international 
trade in banking services and to note on what conditions the existence 
of these benefits seems to depend. I also try to describe some of the 
difficulties and potential dangers that may lie in the international supply 
of banking services. While I hope that my analysis is correct, I will be 
satisfied if others’ efforts to correct my mistakes bring forth some new 
thinking on this subject. 
10.2  The Issues 
My first task is to establish some reasonably concrete notion of what 
is at issue when we are talking about increased international trade in 
banking services. I should stress that 1 am not offering a judgment here 
on which  aspects of trade in banking services most urgently require 
international discussion. Rather, I am simply noting which aspects of 
trade in banking services seem to be on the agenda for the upcoming 
trade round. The first step in this discussion is distinctly positive, not 
normative.  (For a broader survey of important policy issues relevant 
to international banking-mostly  issues that will nor be addressed in 
the course of trade talks-see  Pecchioli  1983.) 
For the most part, we are not talking about lending to, deposit-taking 
from, or  foreign exchange services  for large corporations, sophisticated 
managers  of  large  portfolios,  state enterprises, or national  entities. 
These consumers of banking services generally have access to services 
from any large bank in the world. They can avail themselves of these 
services in the home country headquarters of whatever bank they may 
choose. The most important barriers  that banks face in this kind of 
business are those imposed on them by their home country regulatory 
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successful strategies (too successful in some eyes) for attracting and 
carrying on this sort of  business.  Barriers to trade in  these banking 
services do not seem to have generated much concern. To the extent 
that there is a public policy problem here, it is probably the other way 
around: how to limit these activities to levels considered safe. 
Neither, more generally, are we talking about those services that are 
often classified as constituting truly “international”  banking-that  is, 
services supplied to foreign residents from offices in  a bank’s home 
country. Sometimes these operations can be hindered by restrictions 
on the customer’s ability to do business with a foreign bank. If a firm 
is required, for example, to buy its foreign exchange from or to hold 
its foreign currency balances at its central bank, it may have that much 
less business to transact at some foreign bank. As a practical matter, 
though, these kinds of restraints do not seem to have become a serious 
issue for debate. The range and volume of  services affected do not 
seem to be large, and one hears few complaints about these restraints. 
These sorts of restrictions are sometimes a reflection of economic or 
balance-of-payments problems, and a country imposing them may not 
be the most attractive place for banks to look for new customers any- 
way. Moreover, attempts to limit the opportunities for potential cus- 
tomers to deal with foreign banks sometimes foster a whole new demand 
for foreign banking services as the restricted customer goes through 
complicated maneuvers to keep his assets abroad and beyond the reach 
of the authorities of his country. 
What people really seem to mean when they are talking about in- 
creased trade in banking services is what is often called “multinational” 
banking-services  that  require a local  presence  by  a foreign  bank: 
lending  to  small  and  medium-sized  firms,  mortgage  lending,  retail 
deposit-taking, consumer finance, and a host of so-called non-asset- 
based  services such as securities underwriting, local-currency bond 
trading, foreign exchange services for small and medium-sized firms, 
brokering, custody services, cash letters, lockboxes, and funds collec- 
tion and disbursal services. These are not services that can easily be 
supplied to, say, German residents from a banking office in New York. 
To offer these services, a bank needs to have an operation (as bankers 
and generals like to say) “on the ground” in the market to be served. 
(For a general discussion of this issue, see U.S. Government 1984. For 
a sampling of the debate over how best to gain access for U.S. banks 
to foreign markets, see U.S. Senate 1984.) 
10.3  Obstacles to Trade in Banking Services 
The requirement for a local presence brings a foreign bank face to 
face with the domestic banking policies of the host country, and this 249  Banking Services 
is where the trouble begins. In the past, national policies have explicitly 
prohibited the establishment of foreign-controlled banking institutions. 
As  recently  as  1984, for example,  establishment  of  foreign  banks’ 
branches and subsidiaries was either prohibited by law or not permitted 
by prevailing policy in Australia, New Zealand, Iceland, and Sweden 
(OECD 1984). These absolute bars to entry have been relaxed in the 
past few years, however, and today only Iceland  among the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries 
continues to prohibit all foreign-controlled banking operations. (A num- 
ber of OECD countries require that foreign-controlled banking entities 
take on a particular legal form, usually that of a locally incorporated 
subsidiary.) 
The “right  of establishment”  (to use the current jargon) remains a 
thorny  issue  in  negotiations  between  industrialized  and  developing 
countries (U.S.  Government 1984). The latter sometimes see (probably 
quite correctly) financial services as a growth industry. Further, they 
see (also probably correctly) a network of financial institutions as an 
important part of the infrastructure necessary for economic develop- 
ment. As a result, some developing nations have adopted classic infant- 
industry strategies with respect to financial services, excluding foreign 
banks from their domestic markets in  hopes of  encouraging the de- 
velopment of the local industry. Among industrialized and financially 
sophisticated countries, though, the simple right of establishment is 
usually not a major problem. 
The real  problems in relations among the industrialized  countries 
arise from policies that have the effect-intentionally  or otherwise- 
of discriminating against operations of foreign-controlled banking in- 
stitutions. This discrimination can take many forms. Foreign-controlled 
banks may, for example, be prohibited from engaging in certain lines 
of business or serving particular customers. The most common restric- 
tions of this sort are regulations preventing foreign banks from under- 
writing bond issues or managing or participating in securities issues 
and measures that deny foreign banks access to government deposits. 
Foreign banks are sometimes limited to a specified share of the national 
banking market. In Canada, for example, foreign-controlled banks may 
not hold more than  16  percent of all domestic bank assets. Branches 
of foreign banks must in some instances meet special capital-adequacy 
criteria. Foreign-controlled banking entities are also faced with a va- 
riety of  “nuisance” obstacles to efficient operations. Sometimes these 
take  the form of  immigration policies  that  hinder the use  of  home- 
country nationals or requirements that host-country  nationals be in- 
cluded in  the institution’s management  or on its  board.  Sometimes 
foreign banks do not enjoy the same access to government-controlled 
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Restrictions  are  sometimes  placed  on  the  advertising  of  foreign- 
controlled entities.  In the U.K.,  for example,  advertising by  banks 
based outside the European Community must include a warning about 
the absence of deposit insurance and of possible transfer and exchange 
risks. Even the names of foreign-controlled institutions are sometimes 
subject to regulation. The names of foreign banks operating in Swit- 
zerland must not give the impression that the bank is Swiss, and in the 
Netherlands certain conditions must be met before an institution based 
outside the European Community can use the word “bank” in its name. 
(These examples of  restrictions on foreign banking operations are drawn 
from OECD 1984; Walter 1985; U.S. Government 1984; and U.S. Trea- 
sury 1984.) 
In the industrialized and financially sophisticated world, foreign banks 
are generally permitted to establish representative offices as they please. 
At most, permission of the host government is required, and this per- 
mission is generally granted. These representative offices can be active 
in marketing a bank’s services and in prospecting for customers. They 
cannot actually conduct  businessdannot make  loans,  cannot take 
deposits. 
A full accounting of all the restrictions facing foreign banks is beyond 
the scope of this paper. In 1984, the OECD compiled a summary of 
regulations  affecting  the  establishment  and  operations  of  foreign- 
controlled banks within the OECD area (OECD 1984). Even this sum- 
mary required 84 pages. Moreover, any list of such regulations will be 
out of date almost before it is printed. Since publication of the OECD 
volume, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, Germany, the Neth- 
erlands, France, and the U.K. have all altered policies to reduce ob- 
stacles to foreign banking operations. (Personal communication, U.S. 
Treasury Department). Despite these movements toward liberalization, 
there seems little reason to alter the conclusion reached by Ingo Walter 
in his recent study of barriers to trade in banking and financial service: 
“Foreign-based  financial institutions operate in  one of  the most re- 
strictive environments in international trade” (Walter 1985). 
Any agreement on principles for trade in banking services will almost 
certainly  include  the requirement  that  “national  treatment”  be ex- 
tended to foreign banking entities, making them subject to the same 
rules  as domestic banks. The only  alternative  basis  for agreement, 
“reciprocity”-country A allows banks headquartered in country B to 
carry on only those operations that country B permits to banks head- 
quartered in country A-would  produce a regulatory nightmare with 
foreign banks in a major financial center subject to a variety of different 
limitations.  Neither would  reciprocity do much to advance trade in 
banking  services. Banks operating in  foreign markets  would  be  re- 
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both home and host countries, very likely fewer services than could 
be offered by domestic banks in either country. The general stance of 
the U.S. government in international negotiations on trade in banking 
services is to seek national rather than reciprocal treatment of  U.S. 
banks abroad (U.S. Senate 1984). 
But in some cases, national treatment can be as much of an obstacle 
to trade in banking services as it is a principle for allowing freer trade. 
Canadian banking rules provide a particularly neat example of  how 
national treatment can place a foreign bank at a disadvantage. In order 
that all banking institutions may be unambiguously subject to Canadian 
law and to facilitate oversight of banks by supervisory authorities, the 
Canadian Bank Act requires that all banking entities operating in Can- 
ada be locally incorporated. This effectively prohibits the establishment 
of branches in Canada by foreign banks. Foreign banks may operate 
in Canada, however, through locally incorporated subsidiaries. These 
subsidiaries, so-called schedule B or “closely-held’’ banks, are subject 
to the same regulations as domestic schedule B banks. These subsid- 
iaries are invariably smaller than major Canadian domestic banks, and 
they have no legal claim on the resources of the foreign parent bank 
beyond  their initial capitalization (although a  “comfort  letter”  from 
the foreign parent is required). As a result, they are generally seen as 
poorer credit risks than large Canadian banks and must therefore pay 
higher rates for deposits than do large Canadian banks. Before the 
Bank Act came into force in  1980, foreign banks conducted business 
in  Canada through  special, nonbank financial companies, operating 
under a different  set of  regulations  than did domestic banks.  There 
were many disadvantages to this arrangement as far as the foreign banks 
were concerned, but they were able to fund their operations by issuing 
commercial paper in the name of their parent banks. After 1980, how- 
ever, the new schedule B subsidiaries had to issue certificates of deposit 
in their own names, and subsidiaries of the larger U.S. banks found 
themselves paying about 25 basic points more for funds than previously. 
In the view of some foreign bankers, the extension of national treatment 
to their Canadian operations did more harm than good. 
10.4  Why Trade in Banking Services Has Become an Issue 
Foreign banks have been well represented for a number of years in 
most (although by no means all) major financial centers of  the indus- 
trialized world. In the past, foreign banks usually did not compete with 
domestic banks for domestic business. The foreign banks traditionally 
concentrated their efforts on serving the multinational companies head- 
quartered in their home countries that they had  “followed”  abroad. 
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of less burdensome regulations abroad, offering services to their tra- 
ditional customers at home or in third countries through a foreign office 
where banking regulations allowed types of operations prohibited at 
home. In an important sense, the establishment  of a London branch 
of a U.S. bank during the mid-1970s probably  represented more an 
export of British banking services to the United States than an export 
of U.S. banking services to the U.K. The London branch of the U.S. 
bank was, after all, staffed mostly by Englishmen whose salaries were 
paid largely by U.S. corporations using the branch to gain access to 
the Eurodollar market. When foreign banks did serve local customers, 
it was usually in some transaction that involved the bank’s home coun- 
try or its financial markets-matters  in which the foreign bank would 
be recognized  as having  particular expertise. Domestic  and foreign 
banks usually found themselves in direct competition only in providing 
banking services for customers in third countries. 
This specialization by foreign banks reflected in part their previous 
customer relationships. Banking, it is widely said, is a personal busi- 
ness, and foreign banks naturally concentrated their attention on the 
customers with whom they had had the closest contact. It also reflected 
the fact that, even in the absence of overt discrimination, foreign banks 
were generally at a disadvantage in serving local markets. Without the 
branch  networks, the established customer relationships,  and the fa- 
miliarity with local markets that domestic banks enjoyed, foreign banks 
found themselves without secure local currency deposit bases. To fund 
their local-currency business, foreign banks had to rely primarily  on 
the interbank market. In general, it was more expensive for foreign 
banks to borrow local-currency funds from domestic banks than it was 
for the domestic banks to raise funds directly through deposit taking. 
Thus, foreign banks found themselves at a disadvantage vis-a-vis do- 
mestic banks. This dependence on the interbank market for funding 
also encouraged a certain competitive restraint on the part of  the for- 
eign banks: If you try too aggressively to win the clients that are the 
bread and butter of a domestic bank, you may find your access to funds 
at its interbank window suddenly terminated. 
In recent years, though, this situation has begun to  change. As foreign 
banks have  gained  confidence and experience in  dealing  with  host- 
country firms, they have gradually begun to see opportunities for at- 
tracting  more local  business.  Stronger local  deposit bases have im- 
proved  their competitive position in the local market; and to attract 
these deposits, the foreign  banks have  sought more aggressively to 
serve local customers. At the same time, changing economic conditions 
have  brought  new  opportunities for banks to offer non-asset-based 
services. The booming demand for foreign exchange services in the 253  Banking Services 
late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, opened a major new market 
in which a foreign bank could serve just as well as a domestic one. 
Local-currency funding was much less important in these new lines of 
business, and therefore the disadvantage faced by foreign banks was 
less. 
A worldwide trend toward financial market deregulation and financial 
market innovation has also produced a variety of new possibilities for 
banks, and subsequently  a variety of new  financial instruments and 
services. New markets have opened in which domestic banks have no 
long-standing position. Indeed, in some cases a foreign bank with ex- 
perience at offering a particular service in its home country might find 
itself with an advantage over domestic banks in a market where such 
activity is emerging for the first time. 
A  growing  “internationalization”  of all  business  activity also has 
contributed to eroding barriers to operations by foreign banks. Firms 
in all countries are making increasing use of foreign financial markets. 
It is no longer unusual, for example, for a U.S. firm to borrow Swiss 
francs and convert them to dollars to fund a U.S.  investment program, 
knowingly assuming a foreign exchange risk in return for a lower in- 
terest rate. As firms become more comfortable with the idea of bor- 
rowing foreign currencies, foreign banks without local-currency funding 
will find their positions strengthened. 
Another result of deregulation has been an increased emphasis on 
retail banking as a growth strategy. Services to retail depositors and 
borrowers have traditionally  been among the most heavily regulated 
services provided by banks, and deregulation has therefore opened a 
particularly rich set of opportunities in this area. In the United States, 
and in other industrialized countries as well, retail customers are be- 
coming more aggressive, demanding a wider variety of banking services 
at finer prices.  Many  see retail financial services as a major growth 
industry, and the ability  of foreign  banks to provide  these kinds of 
services is particularly at issue. 
Finally, technological progress in telecommunications and data pro- 
cessing may  have  brought  new  possibilities  for economies of  scale. 
This may be encouraging efforts by banking institutions to grow, and 
foreign markets may in some cases provide the most attractive oppor- 
tunities for growth. 
The last few years, then, have  seen an erosion in  the  “natural” 
barriers to foreign bank operations.  As these barriers have declined, 
what are perceived as “unnatural” barriers-barriers  arising from gov- 
ernment policies-have  loomed relatively larger. This has happened at 
a time when the incentives for expansion by banks into foreign markets 
are also growing. The not very surprising result is intense new interest 254  C. R. Neu 
in how national policies do or do not hinder trade in banking services. 
(For an indication  of  interest within  the banking  community in  im- 
proving access of U.S. banks to  foreign markets, see U.S. Senate1981  .) 
10.5  What  Really Is Being Exported 
What is at issue, then, in the debate over international trade in bank- 
ing services is the right of foreign banks to compete for customers in 
the domestic market of the host country. To what extent, though, does 
the provision of these services really constitute an export? 
A visit to the foreign branch of any major U.S. bank will reveal an 
office staffed overwhelmingly by natives of the host country. Some- 
times this staffing pattern is required by local immigration laws; in many 
OECD countries, obtaining work permits for foreign personnel can be 
difficult. (Restrictions on foreign workers can form very effective bar- 
riers to foreign competition in many service industries, and these rules 
will almost certainly become an important focus for discussion when- 
ever talks on service trade are begun in earnest. It may turn out that 
the real key to  agreement on rules for trade in services will be agreement 
on policies towards foreign workers.) But the use of native staff is also 
simple good business. Language, cultural affinity, and direct experience 
with prevailing local conditions are important elements in successful 
banking relationships, and it is in native staff that these qualities are 
often most easily found. 
Funding, the other principal input to the production of banking ser- 
vices, is generally procured locally as well. Foreign banking operations 
generally rely only minimally on funding from the parent bank, turning 
instead to the local interbank market and, when possible, to local de- 
posits for raising funds, particularly local-currency  funds. The other 
inputs to  this production process-facilities,  communications, data pro- 
cessing, and so on-are  also generally purchased locally. 
Banking services are not like automobiles or textiles. Export either 
of the latter, and you employ more workers and raise incomes in the 
exporting country. To  the extent that other inputs also are produced 
in the exporting country, you increase employment and income that 
much  more. Export banking  services in the sense described above, 
though, and you mostly generate jobs for foreigners, pay interest to 
foreign depositors, and pay foreign suppliers for most of your other 
inputs. What the home country gets is some remitted profits  and a 
modestly increased demand for supervisory and headquarters person- 
nel.  For those who see increased exports of services as an important 
way of increasing employment and income, banking services may turn 
out to be a disappointment. 255  Banking Services 
The other side of the coin is that the importation of banking services 
is unlikely to have a major impact on employment of importing country 
nationals in the banking sector. If a foreign bank captures a significant 
share of the domestic market, workers displaced from a domestic bank 
are likely to find opportunities to move across the street, going to work 
for the newly arrived foreign bank. Indeed, if  some local workers do 
not move across the street, the chances of a foreign bank’s gaining a 
share of the local market are probably small. Neither will the capture 
of  some share of the market by foreign banks affect the demand for 
local deposits or for other inputs to the banking process. If anything, 
the arrival  of  a foreign bank  is likely to increase demand for these 
inputs. A fear that increased imports will leave some local resources 
underutilized (a reasonable concern, at least in political terms, .in the 
case of  merchandise imports) is probably not justified in the case of 
banking services. Those who see international trade in banking services 
as a potential threat to local employment or local income are probably 
worrying unduly. 
What are really being traded in the case of banking services, it would 
seem, are managerial services, technical know-how, networks of con- 
tacts, certain analytical and information services, and the name of the 
parent institution. The only local resource that may be left underutilized 
by an increase in foreign banking activity is local bank management. 
(Similarly, the home-country resource most likely to be more in demand 
as a result of increased trade in banking services is bank management. 
A cynic might see in this an explanation for the vehemence with which 
senior bank executives sometimes approach questions concerning in- 
ternational  trade  in  banking  services.) What  is being exported  and 
imported are not really banking services at all, but the technical and 
managerial  structure necessary  for the local  production  of  banking 
services and the capital necessary to establish a branch or subsidiary 
to deliver banking services. 
This leads to my  first general observation. Discussions of  rules for 
international trade in banking services would seem to have much more 
in  common with  discussions about  rules for international  direct in- 
vestment than with discussions about merchandise trade. Perhaps the 
inclusion of banking services in a round of negotiations aimed at lib- 
eralizing other, more traditional forms of trade is not the best idea. 
This line of argument also raises a suggestion for empirical work. As 
far as I can tell, no one has a good idea about how much “trade” there 
really is  in  banking  services. We  do not  have a clear picture of  the 
value  of  services provided  to banking customers by  foreign banks. 
Neither do we have any idea what fraction of the value of these services 
is  accounted  for by  returns to factors of  production located  in  the 256  C. R. Neu 
foreign bank’s home country. I suspect that the truly “traded”  com- 
ponent of banking services is small, that most of what may appear as 
the  provision  of  banking  services by  a foreign  bank  is  really  local 
production.  I  suspect, therefore, that there is much less to trade in 
banking services than may at first meet the eye. It would be interesting 
to see some careful empirical work in this area. 
10.6  The Benefits of Freer Trade in Banking Services 
To argue that the direct employment and income effects of trade in 
banking services are small is not to argue that trade in banking services 
is an unimportant or an uninteresting issue. The centrality of the bank- 
ing function to the operation of the wider economy is such that ques- 
tions about how the banking system operates and by whom it is operated 
are always important. There is also a particular analytic attraction in 
the question of trade in banking service. Precisely because the direct 
employment implications of such trade are relatively minor, some of 
the more emotional arguments for and against freer trade are mini- 
mized. This gives more leeway for the more fundamental analysis of 
the type that economists prefer.  I now turn to more traditional  argu- 
ments about the benefits of trade in banking services. 
Traditionally, two sorts of gains arise from freer international trade: 
1.  Increased opportunities for trade can promote more intense com- 
petition  within national markets and can lead to more efficient 
production of the traded good or service. 
2.  Each trading nation gains by specializing in the production of the 
goods or services for which it enjoys a comparative advantage. 
Dealing with the first of these benefits is relatively simple. Lack of 
competition in the banking sector, as in any other sector, can allow 
inefficient providers to survive, reducing the range of services available 
to customers, and raise the prices of services that are provided. The 
experience of countries that have deregulated their banking sectors so 
as to allow more competition provides ample proof  of these points. 
Increased competition has forced some banks out of business and forced 
survivors to offer a broader range of customer services at lower prices. 
This is undoubtedly a benefit to customers. 
What is not clear is whether the presence of  foreign banks is nec- 
essary to foster more intense competition. Most obstacles to compe- 
tition in banking services arise from local regulations that prohibit entry 
into the banking sector, fix interest rates, or otherwise restrict com- 
petition. It seems likely that important gains in this direction could be 
achieved simply by adjusting national policies. Indeed, if these policies 257  Banking Services 
are not adjusted, allowing foreign banks to  operate in domestic markets 
will probably do little to encourage competition; newly arrived foreign 
banks will sink into the same comfortable noncompetitive life enjoyed 
by domestic banks. Where restrictive regulations have been relaxed, 
more intense competition  seems to have arisen even without a surge 
of activity by foreign banks. Thus, it would seem that allowing inter- 
national trade in banking services is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
bring about the undoubted benefits arising from more competition in 
the banking sector. 
The issue of  comparative advantage in  banking  services is  more 
difficult. If banks in one country can produce banking services more 
efficiently, in terms of the other goods and services produced in that 
economy, then can banks in another country, and if this efficiency can 
be “exported”-that  is, if it persists when a bank from the first country 
offers  services in  the domestic market of the second-there  will be 
welfare gains to be had by allowing banks from the first country to 
supply banking services in the second. If there is no substantial dif- 
ference in the relative costs of producing banking services in the two 
countries, or if  differences cannot be transferred to another market, 
then there is little to be gained from trade. We have, then, two kinds 
of questions to answer: 
1. What factors can bestow on a bank (or banks based in a particular 
country) greater relative efficiency in providing banking services? 
2. Can this efficiency be “exported”? 
Let us consider a number of possible sources for banking efficiency. 
(In the rest of this discussion, I will sometimes make points in terms 
of absolute rather than strictly comparative advantage. I do this for 
convenience of presentation. All of these points could be made-more 
clumsily-in  terms of comparative advantage without altering the na- 
ture of the results. For a survey of studies on what constitutes advan- 
tage in the international  supply of banking services, see Aliber 1984. 
For a more general discussion of comparative advantage in services 
trade, see Deardorff, 1984.) 
The availability of sufficient numbers of well trained and disciplined 
clerical workers at a relatively low wage will undoubtedly give a coun- 
try a strong advantage in producing banking services. Such workers 
are important inputs to the production of banking services, and a plen- 
tiful  supply of them will reduce the cost of  producing  such services. 
But this workforce is not exportable. As we have already noted, clerical 
staff in the branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks are generally 
hired in local labor markets. Thus, being headquartered in a country 
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to bestow any particular international advantage on a bank. Thus, there 
seems little reason to expect gains from trade to arise because of dif- 
fering labor force characteristics in different countries. 
The efficiency of  bank  operations  can  vary,  of  course, with  the 
quality of bank management. At any given time, there will be a group 
of banks, not necessarily all in the same countries, that will be able 
to offer better or cheaper services than can other banks by virtue of 
their simply being better run than other banks. To the degree that this 
managerial  talent reflects  expertise in  dealing in  particular  financial 
markets, it will not be transferable to markets in other countries. But 
to the extent that it is embodied in personnel policies, operating pro- 
cedures, data-processing operations, or other techniques not unique 
to particular  markets,  it  may  be  “exportable.”  Freer  international 
banking may give rise to welfare gains if  customers are able to avail 
themselves of higher-quality services when from time to time they are 
offered by foreign banks. 
One might wonder, though, whether gains of this sort are likely to 
be very significant. Little banking technology is proprietary. Bank of- 
ficers with detailed knowledge of  banking products and internal op- 
erating  procedures frequently  move  from  bank  to bank,  and  bank 
personnel frequently go abroad to learn the latest techniques employed 
by foreign correspondent banks. It seems unlikely that any bank has 
unique procedures or management secrets that are not known to other 
banks. Further, most large banks have the size and capital resources 
necessary  to implement good  ideas they  pick  up from  the outside. 
(Among U.S. banks at least, the ability to copy new ideas quickly is 
striking.) If differences in product lines or management practices persist 
for extended periods, they are likely to reflect some adaptation to local 
conditions. When foreign products and management techniques differ 
systematically from local ones, the advantage must be presumed to lie 
with local practice. In these circumstances, the products and practices 
of the foreign bank are unlikely to be exportable, and the gains from 
freer trade in banking services are again likely to be minimal. 
A more likely source of  advantage in the provision of banking ser- 
vices lies in differing abilities to attract deposits and to raise capital. 
These abilities will in turn be strongly influenced by national policies 
toward bank regulation. Banks in one country might, for example, be 
perceived as being somewhat safer than banks in other countries. Per- 
haps this is because they are supervised by a regulatory authority seen 
as particularly wise, careful, or strong. Perhaps it is because prevailing 
national banking regulations guarantee particularly prudent behavior. 
Or perhaps banks headquartered in that country have access to a par- 
ticularly reliable lender of last resort. Whatever the reason, these banks 
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will banks less favorably situated. As a result, they will have a cost 
advantage over banks in other countries and should be able to offer 
loans at lower rates and nonasset services at lower prices. These banks 
will enjoy a true advantage; and if  this advantage can be maintained 
in an “export”  market, there will be gains to allowing such banks to 
provide services in foreign markets. 
Banks’ competitive positions  can  also be  affected by  reserve re- 
quirements and regulatory attitudes about capital adequacy. Banks re- 
quired to hold large amounts of non-interest-earning reserves are at a 
disadvantage vis-a-vis banks not required to do so. Banks permitted a 
low capital/asset ratio should be able to offer finer spreads than a bank 
forced to operate with a lower gearing ratio. Obviously, competitive 
advantage in these circumstances is bought with some increase in risk, 
but other policies-such  as strong government guarantees or particu- 
larly  close  supervision-may  compensate for these higher  risks.  In 
terms of usual trade theory, if two countries have differing endowments 
of the factors necessary for efficient banking (such as confidence in the 
banking system or a set of regulatory policies that accommodate bank- 
ing), and if these endowments are reflected in cross-border operations, 
then there may be significant gains from trade. 
Whether these advantages are exportable will depend on the mech- 
anism by which export is accomplished. If the exporting bank estab- 
lishes a branch to serve a foreign market, many of the characteristics 
of the parent bank are exported. The bank’s home-country regulations 
apply to the operation of the branch, home-country authorities oversee 
its operation, and all the resources of the parent bank stand behind it. 
To  the extent that these characteristics  inspire confidence and allow 
the branch to attract deposits or capital easily, the advantages enjoyed 
by  the parent  bank are exportable. Also exportable, in general, are 
home-country reserve requirements and definitions of capital adequacy. 
If  these are the basis of  a competitive advantage, they too can be 
transferred. What is not entirely clear is the extent to which the foreign 
branch has access to the lender-of-last-resort facility of the home coun- 
try central bank. The Concordat concluded among major central banks 
in 1975 suggests that the central bank of the parent should be respon- 
sible for foreign branches. (The text of the Concordat has been pub- 
lished in IMF 1981.) Some doubt remains, however, about whether 
foreign branches can really count on support of  their home-country 
central banks. Fortunately, these guarantees have never been put to a 
test. Even if the support of the home country central bank were certain, 
the export of confidence in the parent bank could never be complete; 
depositors are understandably hesitant to rely on promises by a foreign 
central bank that might have to be mediated through a foreign legal 
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If, on the other hand, the mechanism for export of banking services 
is a foreign subsidiary, export of the parent bank’s advantages is more 
problematic. The subsidiary has no legal recourse to the resources of 
the parent beyond its initial capitalization. Neither do regulatory au- 
thorities in the home country of the parent bank have any direct control 
or supervision of the subsidiary. Reserve requirements and capital ad- 
equacy tests of the host country are operative for the subsidiary. And 
the central bank Concordat makes the host-country central bank the 
lender of  last resort  for the subsidiary.  (That home-country  central 
banks  can feel  little  responsibility  for foreign  subsidiaries was  dra- 
matized in  1982 when, in the wake of the Banco Ambrosiano affair, 
the Bank of Italy refused to extend guarantees to deposits in Banco 
Ambrosiano’s Luxembourg subsidiaries.) I believe that the only things 
that are exported when aforeign subsidiary is established are the parent 
bank’s ability to raise capital and the parent bank’s upper-level man- 
agement structures. It is hard to see how the establishment of a sub- 
sidiary  can provide an effective mechanism for the export of  other 
competitive advantages. This leads to my second general observation: 
If  we are seeking welfare gains from trade in  banking  services, we 
probably must allow cross-border branching; subsidiaries will probably 
not do the trick. 
While establishing foreign branches may be the only way effectively 
to export the important qualities of a bank to foreign markets, branches 
can pose serious difficulties for host countries. The host country can 
generally exercise no control over and only limited surveillance of the 
parent bank, and thus has little control over the soundness of a banking 
institution providing services to its residents. This can be overcome 
by  requiring the formation of  a subsidiary clearly  separate from the 
parent bank. But to do so is sometimes to get the worst of everything. 
By insisting that foreign banks operate as subsidiaries, for example, 
Canada has gotten American bank managers who may or may not fully 
understand the Canadian financial markets in which they operate, with- 
out any recourse to the substantial assets and reserves of the parent 
American banks should these managers get into trouble. A fundamental 
dilemma is  posed:  The benefits of  trade in  banking  services can be 
realized only if  host-country authorities are willing to relinquish reg- 
ulatory control and oversight of some banking institutions operating in 
their territory. Insulation from the dangers of foreign banking practices 
can be bought only at the price of insulation from the benefits of these 
practices as well. 
10.7  The Dangers of International Trade in Banking Services 
Many banks apparently feel that the difficulties of  exporting oper- 
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successful operation in foreign markets is possible.  Why else would 
banks show such interest in establishing a presence in foreign markets? 
If banks think they can succeed in foreign markets, why should we not 
allow them to try their luck? Indeed, since some gains may arise from 
increased trade in banking services, why should we not do everything 
possible to remove barriers to such trade? 
The principal reason for caution in encouraging more trade in banking 
services is that this trade may  erode the safety and stability of the 
global banking system or, depending on prevailing regulatory policies, 
the safety and stability of either host- or  parent-country domestic bank- 
ing systems. In every country, regulatory authorities and central banks 
bear at least  some of the risks inherent in  banking operations. The 
decision  to commence banking  operations in  a foreign market may 
increase the risks borne by regulatory authorities in either the home 
or the parent country without necessarily imposing any additional costs 
on the bank wishing to engage in  multinational business. If, for ex- 
ample, deposits are fully guaranteed by national authorities, depositors 
have no reason to demand higher interest rates even if banks take on 
riskier operations. Similarly, if regulatory authorities do not increase 
the costs of deposit insurance as banks take on riskier operations (and 
how are regulators realistically to measure risks?), banks do not face 
the full extra costs of engaging in riskier business. Thus, moves that 
may appear profitable  to an individual bank, may impose extra risks 
on the wider society and may result in a hidden loss of overall welfare. 
In the usual jargon, moral hazard may result in negative externalities 
when a bank decides to engage in cross-border operations. 
Does the entry of a bank into a foreign market increase the riskiness 
of its operations? Some have argued that by allowing banks to broaden 
the scope of their operations, by allowing them to enter new lines of 
business or to extend their operations geographically,  we allow banks 
to diversify their operations and thereby reduce their risks. This ar- 
gument makes sense only if  the quality of bank management is inde- 
pendent of or  is positively correlated with the scope of banking activity. 
I think that it is not unduly uncharitable to say that recent experience 
has, at the very least, raised some questions about the validity of this 
proposition. The diversification of bank portfolios  away from tradi- 
tional forms of lending into international lending and a variety of new 
services does not seem to have brought about any marked reduction 
in riskiness of major banks. Neither has it made these banks noticeably 
better able to retain their balance when traditional loans (in, for ex- 
ample, the energy or agricultural sector) go bad. 
For some time now, the managements of big banks have faced in- 
centives to grow-often without taking full account of the risks thus 
incurred. Recent difficulties have complicated the process of growth, 
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a better and better paid job to run a bigger bank. Incentives to growth 
may also have been strengthened by recent problems with bad loans: 
One way to deal with a fixed volume of bad  loans is to enlarge the 
bank enough to absorb them, and foreign markets may appear to be a 
fruitful field for expansion. The trick, of course, is to avoid taking on 
more bad loans because the bank is growing too fast. Some have argued 
that the rush by major banks to establish a presence in new markets 
either at home or abroad has distracted management  attention from 
the basic business of credit assessment and risk control. The result is 
at least a perception that major banks are in a more precarious position 
today than at any time since the Great Depression. 
The expansion of  banking activities into new markets also places 
new demands on regulatory authorities. As new financial instruments 
appear, for example, regulators cannot always clearly  identify what 
constitutes credit exposure for a bank.  When  a bank  moves into a 
foreign market, domestic regulators may not fully understand the cir- 
cumstances prevailing in foreign markets or may not have access to 
information  essential  for  assessing  the  creditworthiness of  foreign 
borrowers. 
The presence of foreign banks in national financial markets may also 
increase  somewhat the “interconnectedness”  of the international fi- 
nancial system, making it easier for shocks (and there will inevitably 
be shocks) to propagate through the system. Perhaps one should not 
make too much  of  this point.  The Penn  Square/Continental Illinois 
fiasco made it clear that the degree of interconnectedness  is already 
such that the failure of  a rather small Oklahoma bank could lead to 
severe difficulties for a number of foreign banks that had deposited 
large amounts with Continental. (For a readable and entertaining ac- 
count of the Penn Square debacle, see Singer 1985. A more traditional 
account is available in U.S. Senate 1982.) The situation might not have 
been  appreciably worse if  large numbers of foreign retail customers 
had also been at risk. 
If there is any difference between the situation we have now and the 
situation that might prevail if  there were a significant increase in trade 
in banking services, it might lie in the political implications of a bank 
crisis originating abroad. The non-U.S.  banks that found themselves 
in a difficult spot because of Continental’s troubles were large enough 
and sophisticated enough that they might reasonably have been  ex- 
pected to make informed judgments for themselves about the soundness 
of the U.S. banks they dealt with.  U.S.  regulatory  authorities guar- 
anteed the large deposits of  these banks (a step not required by U.S. 
banking law) in order to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse, 
not because they felt any moral or political obligation to protect these 
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not have felt much obligation to make whole these banks. As long as 
the losses incurred did not threaten the stability of national banking 
systems, there was no reason to act to minimize the losses suffered by 
banks that should  have  known  better than to deposit too much  at 
Continental. 
The situation might have been quite different, though, if Continental 
had had a host of foreign retail customers. These customers could not 
reasonably  have  been expected to assess the relative  safety of  the 
various banks seeking their deposits. If a bank is allowed to take retail 
deposits, it is not unreasonable to expect local authorities to make sure 
it is sound. The burden of assessing the soundness of foreign banks in 
this situation falls more heavily on local regulatory authorities-who 
may or may not be up to the job. Perhaps life would  be simpler all 
around if  local authorities were responsible for local banks only and 
were not expected to take on the daunting task of investigating the 
soundness of every foreign bank that seeks to open up shop in their 
area of responsibility. 
To the extent that one is willing to rely on the terms of the central 
bank Concordat, which calls for the monetary authorities of the parent 
country to stand behind  deposits in  the foreign  branches of  banks 
headquartered in  its territory,  one might  come to the mildly  ironic 
conclusion that the most sensible national policy toward trade in bank- 
ing services would be to seek to attract branches of foreign banks into 
local  markets while  discouraging branching  of  domestic banks into 
foreign markets. This, of course, is just the opposite of what is generally 
sought in discussions of trade in banking services. It may be that one 
of the few things actually being exported when a bank establishes a 
branch in a foreign country is the guarantee of the home-country  reg- 
ulatory  authority to make whole a foreign depositor who might lose 
money as a result of  problems within the multinational bank. The reg- 
ulatory authority in question may or may not receive compensation for 
this extension of  its contingent  liabilities.  If  it  does not, or if  these 
costs are borne by  home-country  interests, the taxpayers,  banking 
customers, or bank shareholders, country A may be providing deposit 
insurance for the residents of country B at little or no cost to B. 
Another danger inherent in wider trade in banking services is the 
pressure that might be brought to  bear on national regulatory authorities 
to make banks under their jurisdiction internationally competitive. We 
have become accustomed to pleas to governments to ease this or that 
requirement  for pollution  control or worker safety in order to make 
some domestic manufacturing industry competitive in world markets. 
Regulatory competition of this sort is often regrettable, the result being 
more injured workers or dirtier air. But at least where manufacturing 
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regulations is usually limited to the constituents of the government that 
knuckled under to pressure. 
Imagine what might happen if  trade in banking  services became a 
major item in some countries’ balance of payments. Pressures would 
arise from the banking lobby that local reserve requirements were too 
high to permit effective competition with foreign banks regulated by 
more “reasonable”  authorities or that local  reporting requirements 
were too burdensome and imposed costs that were pricing domestic 
banks out of foreign markets. I am not being an alarmist; pressure of 
this sort is already being brought to bear. In January 1986, the U.S. 
Federal Reserve proposed  the eminently sensible idea of tying bank 
capital requirements to the riskiness of bank asset portfolios. An official 
of the American Bankers Association opposed such a step on the grounds 
that it would “make the industry less competitive with financial insti- 
tutions that wouldn’t have to meet such standards” (Nash 1986). 
By giving in to these pressures, regulatory authorities would endan- 
ger not only the assets of their own citizens but perhaps the stability 
of the entire global banking  system. One might imagine the result of 
an international competition among national bank regulators, each trying 
to make banks in his own country more competitive. The regulators 
might seek to achieve this end by insisting on extremely prudent be- 
havior, enforced by strict regulation.  Alternatively, regulators  might 
seek competitiveness  through lax regulation, low reserve requirements, 
and relaxed attitudes towards capital adequacy. Badly regulated banks 
might drive out well-regulated ones if the near-term cost advantage of 
being badly regulated were sufficient to allow the former to take mar- 
kets from the latter. Given the difficulties already facing bank regula- 
tors,  perhaps  it  would  be  better  not  to  allow  considerations of 
international competitiveness to influence regulatory policy. Perhaps it 
would be better if banking remained a national industry. My third ob- 
servation, then, is that banks contemplating an expansion into foreign 
markets may not face the full costs of such an expansion. By deciding 
to proceed  with their plans, they may impose excessive costs on all 
the rest of us. 
10.8  International Trade in Banking Services and the Optimal Size 
of Banks 
Another reason for caution in encouraging increased trade in banking 
services is that it might lead to banking markets being dominated  by 
fewer, bigger banks. There is no international bank regulator. As bank 
operations sprawl across the globe, who is to guarantee prudent be- 
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market forces to supply the necessary restraint. Before the Continental 
affair, U.S. regulators had announced what seemed an appealing policy. 
They clearly  stated their intention to limit deposit insurance to the 
$100,000 per depositor per bank prescribed by the policies of the Fed- 
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation. Depositors of larger amounts were 
presumed to have the resources and the sophistication  to form their 
own judgments about how prudently the banks they placed deposits 
with operated. By placing these larger depositors at risk, the authorities 
hoped to impose some market discipline on U.S. banks. Banks with 
suspect loan portfolios or less than entirely reliable funding arrange- 
ments would, the thinking went, find themselves paying a premium for 
their deposits and thus have an incentive to clean up their acts. 
For a policy like this to work, large depositors must believe that they 
really  can lose  their money.  The catch, as it  turned out, was that 
Continental was just too big  to be allowed  to fail; U.S.  authorities 
eventually guaranteed all deposits fully. This is not to suggest that U.S. 
authorities did the wrong thing in the Continental case; they probably 
had no other choice. (At least at the time they thought that they had 
no other choice.) But once they had guaranteed all deposits, the pre- 
viously  announced policy  was seen to have  been a bluff.  It seems 
unlikely that in the next few years any national banking authority will 
be able credibly  to threaten the large depositors of any major bank 
with the possible loss of funds. 
This suggests  that if we are trying to design the global banking system 
for tomorrow, we ought to be seeking ways to produce banking insti- 
tutions that are big enough to capture the substantial economies of 
scale that mark the banking business, but are not so large that they 
cannot fail from time to time. Continental was thought to be too big 
to be allowed to fail, and there are today plenty of banks bigger than 
Continental was.  If  we are going  to have  to rely  on the market to 
encourage prudent banking behavior in the future (and where else will 
we have to turn?), we might want to consider how to reduce the size 
of  some of  the larger  banks, or at least how  to slow their growth 
sufficiently  to let  growth of the world  financial  system reduce their 
relative size. As the costs of information transfer and data processing 
continue to fall, it may also be that the minimum efficient size for a 
bank is decreasing. One wonders if there will be a continuing need for 
the very large financial institutions that we have today. I do not know 
of any serious efforts to estimate costs functions for the production of 
banking services. Work of this sort might yield some interesting insights 
into the optimal size of banking institutions. 
What does this have to do with freer trade in banking services? One 
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concentration in the global banking industry.  Little  is  known about 
market dynamics in the banking industry. I do not really know whether 
large banks have important competitive advantages over small banks. 
It is certainly possible,  though, that only large  banks will  have the 
resources to jump into new markets. And if  such banks succeed in 
capturing a share of foreign markets, it may well be at the expense of 
smaller banks in the host country. My fourth observation is that freer 
trade may result in bigger banks controlling more of the total market 
for banking services-bigger  banks whose failure is likely to be less 
thinkable than was Continental’s. Restricting the geographical spread 
of banks is almost certainly not the ideal way to slow their growth. It 
may, however, be the most natural and politically feasible way to do 
so. 
10.9  What Kinds of Agreements Are Necessary? 
There is no denying the fact that perceived  obstacles to trade in 
banking services are a source of tension today among the developed, 
financially sophisticated countries of North America, Western Europe, 
and the Pacific rim. Banks in all of these countries frequently want to 
do more in foreign markets than host-country  policies will allow, and 
these banks put  pressure on their governments to negotiate  them a 
better deal. I wonder, though, how long-lived this kind of pressure will 
be. We have seen that the principal issues are the right of establishment 
in foreign markets and the terms under which foreign banks are to be 
allowed to operate once they are established. We  have also seen that 
for some kinds of business, local establishment seems to be essential. 
Will this continue to be the case? 
I have no doubt that personal representation  in a particular market 
will always be required. The need for bankers and customers to meet 
face to face seems unlikely to go away. Almost all developed countries 
allow the free establishment and unhindered operation  of representative 
offices of foreign banks. These offices can manage customer contacts, 
negotiate terms of transactions, and generally market the foreign bank’s 
services.  They cannot actually book business.  If  the activities  of  a 
foreign representative office are to bear fruit, a foreign customer must 
ultimately deal with the headquarters of the parent bank or one of its 
branches in a third country. 
There are three kinds of obstacles to these cross-border transactions. 
The first is regulatory: one of the countries involved in the transaction 
may  have capital  controls or currency restrictions  that prohibit  the 
external transaction contemplated. The second is practical:  commu- 
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smooth execution of the transaction. The third is legal: a customer with 
a grievance will have to deal with a foreign legal system. 
All indications are that obstacles of the second sort are being rapidly 
eliminated. Communication and electronic funds transfers are becom- 
ing easier and cheaper. Financial market hours are being extended and 
financial institutions are becoming increasingly willing and able to trans- 
act business around the clock. Customers also are becoming increas- 
ingly comfortable with the prospect of electronic financial transactions. 
When a customer uses an automatic teller machine, transfers funds by 
wire, or takes advantage of automatic funds collection or disbursement 
services, does it really matter whether the computer handling the trans- 
action is in his own country or not? Indeed, we are told that what seem 
to be purely domestic transactions will soon actually be international, 
as, for example, U.S.  banks place “back office” data processing func- 
tions abroad in low-wage areas. 
Obstacles of the first and third types may also be reduced as countries 
seek to adjust their policies and their laws to encourage foreigners to 
bring  their banking  business  to institutions  headquartered there.  It 
seems possible that before  very  long all  of  the functions  that  now 
require a local presence by a foreign bank may be adequately handled 
by a combination of a local representative office and a very good com- 
munications link to the bank’s headquarters. 
If  this  style of  operation  should  become  the  norm,  much  of  the 
difficult debate over appropriate rules for foreign bank establishment, 
what constitutes truly national treatment for foreign banks, and so on 
will have been unnecessary. In this possible world of electronic bank- 
ing, the real issues will be what kinds of national controls on capital 
movements and foreign exchange transactions are suitable, how inter- 
national information flows (potentially involving very sensitive infor- 
mation) are to be regulated, who will be responsible for the smooth 
operation of international interbank clearing systems, and what level 
of foreign exposure is appropriate for banks in the eyes of their home- 
country regulators. There is no reason to think that these issues will 
be any easier to settle than those involved in setting up foreign branches 
and subsidiaries. My  own view is that rules for operating this truly 
international (as opposed to multinational) banking system will be much 
more difficult to devise than the rules that would govern simple estab- 
lishment and operation of foreign bank branches and subsidiaries. But 
we will have to face these problems anyway. Expending time, energy, 
and political capital to facilitate foreign establishment of branches and 
subsidiaries, a style of doing business that already appears somewhat 
outmoded, may represent a diversion of resources from more important 
work. My  fifth and final observation is that we may be getting ready 
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10.10  Conclusions 
My  conclusions are really rather simple. For a variety of reasons, I 
suspect that the next round of trade talks will have a better chance of 
being productive if  the thorny questions of how foreign banks should 
be allowed to operate in national markets are  downplayed. These issues 
will be contentious, and there is no guarantee that success in making 
multinational  banking  more  prevalent  will  make  the world  a better 
place. Much better to concentrate attention on questions of restrictions 
on foreign workers (critical to many service industries), rules for foreign 
direct investment in service industries, international information flows, 
and international payments restrictions. 
The overall tone of this paper may appear to be anti-free trade. This 
is certainly not my general view of the world. We  have for a long time, 
though, recognized that banking is not just another industry, and we 
should at least consider the possibility that our usual approaches to 
international trade may  not be  appropriate to the  banking industry. 
More important, I am troubled that economists have not played a larger 
part in the debate over all aspects of  international financial activity, 
leaving this debate largely to “men of affairs.” If nothing else, I hope 
this paper may provoke some further consideration of this subject by 
economists, if  only to rebut my  positions. It might even be that by 
thinking harder about the place of banking in international trade, we 
may develop a clearer idea of banking’s role in the domestic economy. 
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Comment  Frances Ruane 
Before responding to the papers by Andre Sapir and Richard Neu,* I 
would like to begin by  making some general remarks about trade in 
services.  This  subject has  become very topical  among trade policy 
makers in  recent  years  because of both the growth of  international 
trade in  services and the repeated  suggestions that trade in  services 
may be incorporated within the GATT.’ It has also merited some dis- 
cussion among international trade theorists who have been concerned 
primarily with the conceptual issue of  whether the framework which 
they use to analyze trade in commodities is appropriate for trade in 
services.* If such a framework is appropriate, then the results obtained 
for trade in commodities and the policy implications for trade negoti- 
ations carry through to trade in services. 
From a trade theory perspective, one’s immediate instinct is to pre- 
sume that, at least as far as economic aspects are concerned, trade in 
services is similar to trade in commodities, whatever the legal, insti- 
tutional, or payment differences between them. This contrasts with the 
approach taken by  Hill who argues strongly that  services have two 
specific characteristics  which  goods do not  have  and consequently 
“goods and services belong in different logical categories” (1977, 336). 
The two specific characteristics identified and discussed at length by 
Hill  are nonstorability  and physical proximity, which suggest the re- 
Dr.  Frances  Ruane  is  a fellow  of Trinity  College,  Dublin, and a visiting associate 
*Chapters 9 and 10  in this volume. 
1.  For an  overview of  the  history of trade  negotiations in  services, see Malmgren 
(1985). 
2. See, for example, Hindley and Smith (1984), Deardorff (1985). Jones (1983, Mar- 
kusen (1986a, 1986b), Melvin (1985, 1986a. 1986b). Sampson and Snape (1985), and Sapir 
(1985). 
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quirement that production and consumption of each service must co- 
incide in time and in space, respectively.  While these characteristics 
are common of many services, they are not common to  and I, for 
one, am not convinced of the merits of  searching for characteristics 
which are common to all services. What is more important is that we 
have a framework which allows us to analyze the different channels 
through which trade in services takes place, especially at a time when 
we are contemplating negotiations which will affect these  channel^.^ 
Focussing on channels rather than basic characteristics, I have found 
it helpful to look at services conceptually in terms of whether they are 
actually tradable or nontradable, and whether  or not, for any given 
economy, foreign-owned factors are required in the production of ser- 
vices. Figure C9- 10.1 illustrates. 
Box  1  contains those services which are produced using domestic 
factors only and which are sold only on the domestic market. This 
category includes what one would consider traditional  services, such 
as restaurants, general retailing, etc. Box 2 contains services that are 
produced by domestic resources only but that are traded internation- 
ally. Examples of such services are life insurance, engineering designs, 
etc. Box 3 contains services which are nontraded but which require 
foreign as well as domestic factors in  production. Examples of such 
services are certain types of international banking, and certain types 
of consultancy. Finally box 4 contains those services which are both 
traded internationally and which use foreign as well as domestic factors. 
An example of  such a service would be a U.S. bank in Brussels which 
services loans to Italy. 
While in each case I have given examples of services which may fall 
into a particular box, 1 wish to stress that I do not believe that one 
should  necessarily attempt to classify whole sections of  the service 
sector in this way; rather in looking at a particular service sector ac- 
tivity, it might be helpful to identify it in terms of this classification. In 
the context of the issues of this conference and both Sapir’s and Neu’s 
papers, I found this framework useful in that it allows one to identify, 
according to the way in  which a service is classified, the focus for 
policies and negotiations. For example, services in  box  1  are strictly 
domestic and are indistinguishable from what trade theorists have called 
nontraded goods. The prices of  such services are determined by  the 
parameters of the production process, the availability of domestic fac- 
tors of production, domestic consumer tastes and the degree of com- 
petitiveness in that sector. Clearly services of this type should not fall 
within the arena of trade negotiations. By contrast, for policy purposes, 
3. Exceptions have been noted, for example, in  Bhagwati  (1985). 
4. This approach is similar to that taken in  Melvin (1986a, 1986b). 271  Banking Services 








Fig. C9-10.1  Analysis of services with respect to the tradability of outputs 
and the ownership of production factors. 
services in  box  2  should be treated in  like manner to commodities, 
where instead of tariff and quota negotiations, intergovernmental ne- 
gotiations would take the form of negotiations on barriers to entry, such 
as domestic regulation.  Furthermore, it must be recognized that dif- 
ferences in the methods of payment and the legal status of the services 
will have implications for such negotiations. 
In  the  case of  services in  box  3, the  service itself is  not  traded 
internationally but  is  produced  in  the country  in  which  it  is  to be 
consumed. Furthermore, there is no necessity in many instances for 
the foreign-owned factor to physically cross national boundaries; the 
only requirement is that it combine with local factors to produce the 
service. Of course in many instances it will move physically but it is 
the foreign ownership that is the essential c~mponent.~  This feature of 
service markets is similar analytically to the case of international factor 
mobility where the foreign factor is used in the nontraded sector; see 
for example, Jones, Neary, and Ruane (1983). The characteristics  of 
services in box 3 indicate clearly that negotiations in this area are about 
the use and payment of  internationally-owned  factors and the nature 
and extent of  competition in the domestic market. GATT negotiators 
in such areas would find themselves breaking new ground, as the whole 
area of  international factor mobility, use and payment typically  lies 
outside the GATT framework. I will return to this issue below. In the 
case of  box 4,  we have the combination of  trade at  the output and 
factor level, so that policies appropriate in both box 2 and box 3 may 
be relevant here. 
Turning now to the papers presented in this session, Richard Neu 
provides a very detailed qualitative account of  the various activities 
which fall under the heading of international banking. (The difficulties 
involved in quantitatively measuring the scale of trade in banking ser- 
vices are discussed in St.-Hilaire and Whalley [ 19861 who provide some 
5. This point is particularly important in the case of services. See Deardorff (1985). 272  C. R.  Neu 
estimates of trade in banking services for the United States.) Because 
he looks at banking in isolation, Neu’s paper tends to emphasize the 
differences rather than the similarities between banking and other eco- 
nomic activities. In fact, as Neu implicitly recognizes in his first general 
observation, international banking typically  involves the  use  of  do- 
mestic and foreign-owned factors to produce a nontraded service; in 
other words, in terms of the framework presented above, international 
banking services fall primarily into box 3, with some activities in boxes 
2 and 4. Apart from some initial capital and a few key personnel, the 
major foreign-owned factors involved  are management  services and 
information, both  of  which can be combined  with domestic factors 
without leaving the parent headquarters.  Once one recognizes this, 
international banking seems less complex as an activity for analysis 
and the details in the paper can be seen in a more structured way. 
Not surprisingly, a major issue discussed in the paper is whether or 
not there are welfare gains from increased international banking. For- 
mally, if we accept that international services are primarily in box 3, 
this question is analogous to the question posed in the international 
trade literature of whether or not there are gains from increased mo- 
bility of sector-specific factors when the sector involved is both non- 
traded and noncompetitive. This question is difficult to answer since 
we are quite obviously in a second-best world. However, we can make 
some general observations about the elements which would determine 
whether the answer is likely to be positive or negative.  In particular, 
the source of the noncompetitiveness in the domestic market is crucial. 
For example, if the source of the distortion is government regulations, 
and the foreign banks are offering no additional services, then it is quite 
possible that increased foreign  banking will  reduce  welfare.  To  the 
extent that new services are offered, there will be an offsetting welfare 
gain. On the other hand, to the extent that the source of  the noncom- 
petitiveness is due to cartelization and that this is reduced or abolished 
by increased international banking, then there is likely to be a welfare 
gain.  Looking  at the experience in  the United Kingdom (Llewellyn 
1986) and Ireland (McGowan 1986), for example, it seems clear that a 
considerable portion of the increase in competition in the banking sec- 
tor in  recent  years  and  the pressure for deregulation is due to the 
growing presence of foreign banks. A further element in determining 
whether there are welfare gains from international banking is the treat- 
ment of taxation of the returns to the internationally-mobile  factors. 
The issue of  taxation  of  factor rewards  and profits  in  international 
banking is a somewhat surprising omission from Neu’s paper. 
In his paper, Neu analyzes the welfare gains of increased interna- 
tional banking by reference to banking as a traded  service; in  other 
words, he analyzes banking services as if they are box 2-type  activities, 273  Banking Services 
although he subsequently describes them in terms of box 3 activities.6 
He argues that  if  foreign banks can produce banking services more 
efficiently than  domestic banks, then  there is a potential  gain from 
international trade in banking services; in his opinion, a crucial deter- 
minant  of  whether  or not  this gain will  be  transferred  to domestic 
consumers is the organization of the international banking system. In 
particular, he states, in his second observation, that “we must probably 
allow cross-border branching; subsidiaries will  probably  not  do the 
trick.”  His argument is that unless there is branch banking, the char- 
acteristics of the parent bank are not exported, and hence the gains 
from international banking are not realized. I found his argument un- 
convincing, as both subsidiaries and branches have equal access to the 
major foreign-owned factors employed in banking, referred to above. 
Furthermore, I do not know of any evidence to support the view that 
subsidiaries have to pay higher interest rates than branches to secure 
funds, which might support Neu’s contention that branches can transfer 
benefits to domestic consumers that are not transferred by ~ubsidiaries.~ 
However, the issue of  whether or not international banking takes 
places through subsidiaries or branches is extremely important in the 
context of the optimal size of banks from a global perspective. As Neu 
points  out, one of  the major  concerns with  increased  international 
banking is that the economies of scale involved will most likely result 
in  a few very  large banks which governments may  find themselves 
having to bail out if  there is a major crisis. Since it is hard to imagine 
any agency which could effectively or sensibly regulate banks inter- 
nationally, the only effective method of  regulating international banks 
is good local regulation, and, for this to operate, international banking 
must operate through subsidiaries. Good regulation would ensure that 
neither Neu’s third observation, that foreign banks may not bear the 
full costs of  their expansions, nor his fourth observation, that inter- 
national  banks may  become undesirably  large, would be realized  in 
practice.8 Good regulation benefits both home and host countries as 
well as the international bank itself, by reducing its monitoring costs. 
Unlike Richard Neu, AndrC Sapir attempts to imbed his analysis of 
telecommunications in the general context of trade in services. In fact, 
6.  This view of trade in banking services is supported by St.-Hilaire and Whalley who 
conclude, on the basis of their empirical analysis, that “[slervice  trade, as it relates to 
banking, may be an important investment issue, but does not appear to be that important 
a trade issue” (St.-Hilaire and Whalley 1986, 11). 
7. In Ireland, for example, it would appear that foreign banks are able to compete on 
equal terms with domestic banks (see McGowan 1986). 
8. There is also no evidence so far of  an international  cartel emerging as a result of 
economies of.scale in international banking. In fact, as Andre Sapir suggests in his paper, 
it seems likely that lower technology costs will reduce the relative importance of econ- 
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using the framework outlined above, it is possible to pinpoint the role 
which the development of information technology  and telecommuni- 
cations has played  in  the recent’  internationalization of the services 
sector. In effect, many of the services which would typically have fallen 
into box  1, i.e., strictly local services, have through the development 
of telecommunications and information technology during the past fif- 
teen years  moved into boxes  2, 3, or 4.  The analogy here  with the 
effect of  the reduced cost of transportation on trade in commodities, 
as noted by Sapir, is very strong. Furthermore, future developments 
in telecommunications may well lead to more services moving between 
boxes. To  take an example from the banking area, developments in 
telecommunications and computers may result in  some banking ser- 
vices which are currently undertaken by local subsidiaries and branches 
being transferred to the bank’s headquarters, involving the movement 
of activities from box 3 to box 2. Such developments will be influenced 
not only by developments in telecommunications but also by interna- 
tional and national regulatory activities, which may reinforce or coun- 
teract the pressures created by technological changes. 
In his general discussion of  services, in  addition to the two char- 
acteristics already noted by Hill (1977), Andre Sapir notes that intan- 
gibility is a further characteristic of  services, where the intangibility 
arises from the difficulty of evaluating services ex ante.9 As a result of 
this intangibility, Sapir argues, “it is the principles of reputation and 
qualification that play an overriding role in the selection of suppliers.” 
He goes on to argue, and I agree with him fully, that  services char- 
acterized by such intangibility are likely to be traded more intru- rather 
than interfirm, as the greater the degree of intangibility, the more dif- 
ficult it is to trade with an “unrelated party.” However, he subsequently 
suggests that if a country with the lowest production cost of a particular 
service is unable to export that service because it lacks reputation, the 
principle of comparative advantage might not apply. I have to disagree 
with  his  interpretation  of  this occurrence as a possible violation  of 
comparative advantage, because he is not in essence comparing two 
identical services. Either one can look at this issue formally in terms 
of comparative advantage under uncertainty or one can interpret the 
reputation of a service as an attribute of the service (essentially inter- 
nalizing the uncertainty) which means that the two services are not 
identical. Hence, while I agree with Sapir’s point that low-cost centres 
may initially have a problem establishing a reputation for certain ser- 
vices (as indeed Japan and many of the NICs had with manufactured 
9.  Sapir develops the notion of intangibility  from earlier work by Caves (1982) and 
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products in the past three decades), I would not agree that this should 
be interpreted as a violation of comparative advantage. 
Returning to the crucial role that telecommunications may play in 
the expansion of international services, I should like to add two related 
points here in the context of Sapir’s paper. First, and this applies to 
the telecommunications sector as well as other service sectors, changes 
in technology may quickly render regulatory negotiations obsolete, and 
regulatory mechanisms may themselves lead to particular technological 
developments. To view technological developments as random in this 
context could be dangerously naive, just as presuming that nontariff 
barriers might not emerge where once there were tariff barriers  has 
proved to be in goods markets. Second, in the telecommunications field 
technological developments raise very interesting issues about our tra- 
ditional concepts of natural monopolies. Where once it was common 
to think  of  certain industries as being,  in  some fundamental  sense, 
natural monopolies, we realize that this description may not be appro- 
priate in the longer term. Thus, while the basic infrastructure of  tele- 
communications fits comfortably with our idea of a natural monopoly, 
the market for the range of services which such a system can facilitate 
may be more appropriately described as competitive. It seems to me 
that the phenomenon  which Andre Sapir describes in  the telecom- 
munications sector may be much more widespread. 
In conclusion, my strong impression from these two papers is that 
GATT negotiators should be very wary about entering the arena of 
trade in  services.  I would, therefore, support the cautionery  stance 
taken  in  Uruquay,  as referred  to in  Andre  Sapir’s introduction.  In 
almost every section of services, negotiators would have to deal, not 
only with international factor usage, where the factors may or may not 
move  across national  boundaries,  but  also, in many  instances with 
domestic regulation. Rather than attempting to negotiate trade-offs be- 
tween  different  countries’ discriminatory regulations, time might be 
better  spent attempting to convince governments  of  the benefits  of 
sensible domestic regulation. 
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Comment  Gary P.  Sampson 
While international service transactions (e.g., shipping, telecommuni- 
cations, patents, finance) have long been the subject of intensive mul- 
Gary  P.  Sampson was employed  by the  United  Nations  Conference on Trade  and 
Development at the time of writing.  He is now Senior Counsellor, General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade  (GATT), Geneva. The views in  this paper are his own and  not 
necessarily those of either institution. 277  Banking Services 
tilateral deliberation, in recent years interest in this area has grown. 
At  least one of  the reasons for this  is  mentioned  in both  papers*: 
Richard  Neu  and Andre Sapir indicate that  some-especially policy 
makers in the United States-consider international service transac- 
tions to be the next frontier for trade liberalization.  Progress toward 
an agenda for negotiation,  however, has been particularly slow, and 
both papers contain useful material in helping to understand why. For 
the purposes of exposition, it is possible to group some of the reasons 
under two headings. First, various initiatives (notably the United States’ 
initiative at the November  1982 Ministerial Meeting in  GATT) have 
attempted to deal with  services as a sector rather than as individual 
activities. Second, the services sector has been raised in the context 
of “trade liberalization.” 
Services as a Sector 
Dealing with services as a sector throws into sharp relief the problems 
of dealing with an extremely heterogeneous group of economic activ- 
ities  in  a  systematic  manner.  While  some  services are functionally 
related (e.g., telecommunications is an input into banking), others such 
as neurosurgery and the provision of  party rental facilities have little 
in common. Maritime transport and fast food franchising are very dif- 
ferent  economic activities with  very  different  production functions. 
Treating services as a sector led to a search for characteristics that 
would permit what are essentially heterogeneous activities to be dealt 
with in a common analytical framework-something  that is not possible 
by  simply grouping them as “invisible”  or “residual”  items as has 
been done on past occasions. Various characteristics have been iden- 
tified and Andre Sapir, for example, pays particular attention to the 
nonstorable nature of  services.  Because of  this, the production and 
consumption of services must generally take place in the same location 
at the same time. This leads to an important conclusion-the  production 
and consumption of services frequently requires mobility of the factors 
producing the services or of  the consumers consuming them. In this 
sense, services and goods are different. A further extension  of  the 
conclusion is that controls on international services transactions (or 
“barriers to trade in services”) come from restricting the movement 
of the factors producing the services and/or the consumers who receive 
the services. Sapir also addresses a related question: namely, whether 
the principle of comparative advantage holds for this diverse group of 
activities in  the same way as it holds for goods. After a brief review 
of the literature Sapir concludes that in this respect there is no differ- 
ence between services and merchandise trade. 
*Chapters 9 and 10  in this volume. 278  C. R. Neu 
When looking at services (individually or as a sector) it is clear that 
further complications arise as there is a dearth of systematic quanti- 
tative information on international services transactions. The authors 
make this plain in their case studies of the banking and telecommunica- 
tion industries. With respect to measuring the value of transactions, 
Richard Neu raises the very important question of what is in fact being 
traded when an international service transaction takes place. If the sale 
of the banking service is done via an “on-ground”  presence in  the 
importing country (e.g., through branch banking), there are important 
conceptual and practical difficulties in measuring the value of the ser- 
vice provided. We  do not know, for example, what share of value added 
(or “retained  value”)  is accounted for by returns to factors of pro- 
duction engaged in the importing and exporting country. At the same 
time, Neu throws some cold water on the hopes that an international 
expansion of banking services will create jobs in the exporting country; 
in his view, exporting banking services may mean that jobs are created 
by the foreign bank mostly for foreigners. 
Liberalizing Trade in Services 
The second group of  reasons  explaining the protracted nature of 
discussions is that they are taking place in the context of trade liber- 
alization  of  services activities. For  tariff liberalization  in goods-as 
carried out in the postwar GATT rounds of multilateral trade negoti- 
ations-life  was relatively uncomplicated. Ad valorem tariffs can be 
compared across goods. An  important complication arises  with the 
services sector when discussing “trade liberalization” in the traditional 
GATT sense of  an exchange of  “concessions.”  Should such conces- 
sions be exchanged across activities (e.g.,  market access in banking 
against market access in telecommunications) or should they be within 
the same service activities? As Richard  Neu  notes,  the idea of  ex- 
changing preferential  market access for different foreign banks oper- 
ating  in  the  same  market  is  something  that  would  prove  to  be 
unmanagable. 
In addition, unlike services, goods pass through customs houses, and 
tariff barriers  are very apparent. As mentioned  above, however,  in- 
ternational services transactions frequently require the movement of 
the factors of production and receivers of the services; trade liberali- 
zation in  services involves changing national  rules and  procedures. 
Services include a number of “sensitive”  activities with national laws 
relating  to their production  and  distribution-banking  and telecom- 
munications are two examples. For activities of national importance, 
intergovernmental discussions are sure to be intense and protracted. 
Andre Sapir, for example, notes that the governments of the EC and 
the United States have very different perceptions as to how the tele- 279  Banking Services 
communications industry should be structured. The EC assigns a spe- 
cial importance to telecommunication activities, and national regulation 
has resulted in a state monopoly. The United States government has 
a different perception and private firms operate in an increasingly com- 
petitive market. The U.S.  government promotes competition and re- 
cent technological developments are such that competition will be further 
promoted  in the United States. The interesting question which Sapir 
poses is whether with these technological developments it will be pos- 
sible to contain the monopoly in the EC. Richard Neu also pays par- 
ticular attention to the sensitive nature of banking and, as he says, 
since countries have legitimate national needs (in regulating banking) 
and perceptions about what is in their national interests-painstaking 
negotiations would be necessary to reconcile these legitimate national 
needs. 
Whether sensitive activities or not, liberalization of services trade 
involves difficulties. In looking at these, it is useful to consider three 
groups of services.  First, there are services that do not, because of 
their nature, cross national  boundaries.  These must be consumed in 
the importing country by the receiver of the service. Andre Sapir men- 
tions the PTT in Europe; here for example, local mail delivery services 
can only be traded internationally if  there is international movement 
of factors of production.  Other examples include the construction of 
roads and other public works such as the provision of municipal sew- 
erage facilities.  Fields (the receiver of the service) cannot be shipped 
abroad to be ploughed.  But there can be international transactions in 
these activities if there is movement in the factors of production; labor 
or capital must cross the border for the service to be produced in the 
country of consumption, and must face the national  laws relating  to 
foreign investment and the granting of work visas. A further example 
is the provision of branch-banking services. 
Richard Neu gives some interesting insights into what he calls mul- 
tinational  banking  (as compared with  international  banking),  which 
requires an “on-the-ground’’ presence for  the local market to  be served. 
Here, national policies have in some countries explicitly prohibited the 
establishment  of foreign-controlled banking institutions; rights of es- 
tablishment have not been granted to foreign banks. Neu notes, how- 
ever, that since the establishment rules in most industrialized countries 
have been liberalized, the real problems in these countries now arise 
from policies that have the effect of discriminating against the operation 
of foreign-controlled banking institutions. This is the problem of na- 
tional treatment for foreign banks operating in the domestic market. 
Richard Neu gives the example of banking  services which could po- 
tentially  be supplied to foreign  residents  from offices in  the bank’s 
home country if there were not national rules which discriminate spe- 280  C. R.  Neu 
cifically against foreign operations. Firms in the foreign country may 
be  prohibited  from carrying out foreign exchange business, for ex- 
ample, as their potential clients have to conform to national rules and 
hold and exchange foreign currency with their own central bank. 
Thus, where factor movement is important for international service 
activities, “right of establishment”  and “national treatment”  emerge 
as major issues. Restrictions on factor movement are imposed by means 
of  the issuance of  work permits and constraints on the behavior  of 
foreign capital. Foreign Investment Review Boards and Departments 
of Immigration are notoriously sensitive institutions when it comes to 
deregulation, and progress in this direction can therefore be expected 
to be slow. 
A second class of services includes those that can be produced with 
or without factor movement. Presumably, a bridge to be constructed 
in Australia can be equally well designed in Sydney or San Francisco, 
but the life of the consulting engineer may be considerably simplified 
if he can visit the site of construction when necessary or perhaps even 
install an office. So, too, for computer programmers wishing to talk to 
their clients, and insurance companies hoping to sell insurance to theirs. 
There are many banking and telecommunication activities that are fa- 
cilitated through a local presence in  the importing country. Thus, in 
such cases, if  there are restrictions on the movement of factors, the 
provision of the service may not be prohibited-it  is just rendered more 
difficult. 
Finally, for an international transaction to take place in some ser- 
vices, it is necessary to have mobility of the receiver of the service. 
The Taj Mahal cannot be shipped to California to be viewed by Amer- 
icans any more than Disneyland can be shipped to India. There must 
be mobility of the receivers. So, too, for university students who study 
in foreign countries, and aircraft which are shipped internationally for 
specialized repairs. Here the constraints on trade are again national 
regulations-tourist  visas granted by  the government of the country 
exporting the service and foreign exchange controls for residents of 
the country of import. 
Both papers could be improved if they contained better quantitative 
material. As noted above, data are hard to find, but they are not non- 
existent. There are no statistics in the paper by Richard Neu and some 
of the quantitative material in the paper by Andre Sapir could be im- 
proved. The market access question for telecommunication products 
would have been more informative if  the author had presented more 
detailed information on the nature of the goods traded internationally, 
the direction of  trade flows, and the tariff and nontariff barriers con- 
fronting such trade. Such information would assist in forming an opin- 
ion as to whether trade liberalization in these goods should be a priority 
matter for any forthcoming trade negotiations. 281  Banking Services 
The authors conclude  by  offering suggestions  as to what all  this 
means for any  future trade-liberalizing  negotiations  in  banking  and 
telecommunications. Richard  Neu  concludes that  the next round of 
trade talks will have a better chance of being productive if the “thorny” 
question of how foreign banks should be allowed to operate in national 
markets is downplayed. Based on the evidence, this seems to be a very 
sensible  statement and one wonders to what  extent this conclusion 
applies to a variety of other thorny services activities. Andre Sapir’s 
conclusions appear no less reasonable. He notes that the focus of future 
international negotiations will be productive if they are directed toward 
establishing a greater degree of understanding between governments 
with  regard  to their  “regulatory  philosophies”  and toward  a  “har- 
monization of national attitudes.”  He is of  the view that such negoti- 
ations are best carried out between governments with common economic 
situations and principles; as far as the EC and the United States are 
concerned, the appropriate forum is the OECD. There is of  course 
merit in this, but decisions that are taken on the nature of international 
telecommunication activities in future years will have effects that tran- 
scend these economies. The interests of  producers and consumers of 
services deserve to be represented  in such negotiations, even if  their 
countries are not members of the OECD. This Page Intentionally Left Blank